Network Working Group R. Sparks, Ed.
Request for Comments: 4475 Estacado Systems
Category: Informational A. Hawrylyshen
Ditech Networks
A. Johnston
Avaya
J. Rosenberg
Cisco Systems
H. Schulzrinne
Columbia University
May 2006
Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Torture Test Messages
Status of This Memo
This memo provides information for the Internet community. It does
not specify an Internet standard of any kind. Distribution of this
memo is unlimited.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2006).
Abstract
This informational document gives examples of Session Initiation
Protocol (SIP) test messages designed to exercise and "torture" a SIP
implementation.
Table of Contents
1. Overview ........................................................3
2. Document Conventions ............................................3
2.1. Representing Long Lines ....................................4
2.2. Representing Non-printable Characters ......................4
2.3. Representing Long Repeating Strings ........................5
3. SIP Test Messages ...............................................5
3.1. Parser Tests (syntax) ......................................5
3.1.1. Valid Messages ......................................5
3.1.1.1. A Short Tortuous INVITE ....................5
3.1.1.2. Wide Range of Valid Characters .............8
3.1.1.3. Valid Use of the % Escaping Mechanism ......9
3.1.1.4. Escaped Nulls in URIs .....................11
3.1.1.5. Use of % When It Is Not an Escape .........11
3.1.1.6. Message with No LWS between
Display Name and < ........................12
Sparks, et al. Informational [Page 1]
RFC 4475 SIP Torture Test Messages May 2006 3.1.1.7. Long Values in Header Fields ..............12 3.1.1.8. Extra Trailing Octets in a UDP Datagram ...14 3.1.1.9. Semicolon-Separated Parameters in URI User Part .............................16 3.1.1.10. Varied and Unknown Transport Types .......16 3.1.1.11. Multipart MIME Message ...................17 3.1.1.12. Unusual Reason Phrase ....................18 3.1.1.13. Empty Reason Phrase ......................19 3.1.2. Invalid Messages ...................................20 3.1.2.1. Extraneous Header Field Separators ........20 3.1.2.2. Content Length Larger Than Message ........20 3.1.2.3. Negative Content-Length ...................21 3.1.2.4. Request Scalar Fields with Overlarge Values ..........................22 3.1.2.5. Response Scalar Fields with Overlarge Values ..........................23 3.1.2.6. Unterminated Quoted String in Display Name ..............................24 3.1.2.7. <> Enclosing Request-URI ..................25 3.1.2.8. Malformed SIP Request-URI (embedded LWS) ..26 3.1.2.9. Multiple SP Separating Request-Line Elements .....................27 3.1.2.10. SP Characters at End of Request-Line .....28 3.1.2.11. Escaped Headers in SIP Request-URI .......29 3.1.2.12. Invalid Timezone in Date Header Field ....30 3.1.2.13. Failure to Enclose name-addr URI in <> ...31 3.1.2.14. Spaces within addr-spec ..................31 3.1.2.15. Non-token Characters in Display Name .....32 3.1.2.16. Unknown Protocol Version .................32 3.1.2.17. Start Line and CSeq Method Mismatch ......33 3.1.2.18. Unknown Method with CSeq Method Mismatch .33 3.1.2.19. Overlarge Response Code ..................34 3.2. Transaction Layer Semantics ...............................34 3.2.1. Missing Transaction Identifier .....................34 3.3. Application-Layer Semantics ...............................35 3.3.1. Missing Required Header Fields .....................35 3.3.2. Request-URI with Unknown Scheme ....................36 3.3.3. Request-URI with Known but Atypical Scheme .........36 3.3.4. Unknown URI Schemes in Header Fields ...............37 3.3.5. Proxy-Require and Require ..........................37 3.3.6. Unknown Content-Type ...............................38 3.3.7. Unknown Authorization Scheme .......................38 3.3.8. Multiple Values in Single Value Required Fields ....39 3.3.9. Multiple Content-Length Values .....................40 3.3.10. 200 OK Response with Broadcast Via Header Field Value .......................................40 3.3.11. Max-Forwards of Zero ..............................41 3.3.12. REGISTER with a Contact Header Parameter ..........42 Sparks, et al. Informational [Page 2]
RFC 4475 SIP Torture Test Messages May 2006 3.3.13. REGISTER with a url-parameter .....................42 3.3.14. REGISTER with a URL Escaped Header ................43 3.3.15. Unacceptable Accept Offering ......................44 3.4. Backward Compatibility ....................................44 3.4.1. INVITE with RFC 2543 Syntax ........................44 4. Security Considerations ........................................45 5. Acknowledgements ...............................................46 6. Informative References .........................................46 Appendix A. Bit-Exact Archive of Each Test Message ................47 A.1. Encoded Reference Messages ................................48 1. Overview This document is informational and is NOT NORMATIVE on any aspect of SIP. This document contains test messages based on the current version (2.0) of the Session Initiation Protocol as, defined in [RFC3261]. Some messages exercise SIP's use of the Session Description Protocol (SDP), as described in [RFC3264]. These messages were developed and refined at the SIPIt interoperability test events. The test messages are organized into several sections. Some stress only a SIP parser, and others stress both the parser and the application above it. Some messages are valid, and some are not. Each example clearly calls out what makes any invalid messages incorrect. This document does not attempt to catalog every way to make an invalid message, nor does it attempt to be comprehensive in exploring unusual, but valid, messages. Instead, it tries to focus on areas that have caused interoperability problems or that have particularly unfavorable characteristics if they are handled improperly. This document is a seed for a test plan, not a test plan in itself. The messages are presented in the text using a set of markup conventions to avoid ambiguity and meet Internet-Draft layout requirements. To resolve any remaining ambiguity, a bit-accurate version of each message is encapsulated in an appendix. 2. Document Conventions This document contains many example SIP messages. Although SIP is a text-based protocol, many of these examples cannot be unambiguously rendered without additional markup due to the constraints placed on the formatting of RFCs. This document defines and uses the markup Sparks, et al. Informational [Page 3]
RFC 4475 SIP Torture Test Messages May 2006 defined in this section to remove that ambiguity. This markup uses the start and end tag conventions of XML but does not define any XML document type. The appendix contains an encoded binary form of all the messages and the algorithm needed to decode them into files. 2.1. Representing Long Lines Several of these examples contain unfolded lines longer than 72 characters. These are captured between <allOneLine/> tags. The single unfolded line is reconstructed by directly concatenating all lines appearing between the tags (discarding any line feeds or carriage returns). There will be no whitespace at the end of lines. Any whitespace appearing at a fold-point will appear at the beginning of a line. The following represent the same string of bits: Header-name: first value, reallylongsecondvalue, third value <allOneLine> Header-name: first value, reallylongsecondvalue , third value </allOneLine> <allOneLine> Header-name: first value, reallylong second value, third value </allOneLine> Note that this is NOT SIP header-line folding, where different strings of bits have equivalent meaning. 2.2. Representing Non-printable Characters Several examples contain binary message bodies or header field values containing non-ascii range UTF-8 encoded characters. These are rendered here as a pair of hexadecimal digits per octet between <hex/> tags. This rendering applies even inside quoted-strings. Sparks, et al. Informational [Page 4]
RFC 4475 SIP Torture Test Messages May 2006 The following represent the same string of bits: Header-name: value one Header-name: value<hex>206F6E</hex>e The following is a Subject header field containing the euro symbol: Subject: <hex>E282AC</hex> 2.3. Representing Long Repeating Strings Several examples contain very large data values created with repeating bit strings. Those will be rendered here using <repeat count=some_integer>value</repeat>. As with <hex>, this rendering applies even inside quoted strings. For example, the value "abcabcabc" can be rendered as <repeat count=3>abc</repeat>. A display name of "1000000 bottles of beer" could be rendered as To: "1<repeat count=6><hex>30</hex></repeat> bottles of beer" <sip:beer.example.com> A Max-Forwards header field with a value of one google will be rendered here as Max-Forwards: 1<repeat count=100>0</repeat> 3. SIP Test Messages 3.1. Parser Tests (syntax) 3.1.1. Valid Messages 3.1.1.1. A Short Tortuous INVITE This short, relatively human-readable message contains: o line folding all over. o escaped characters within quotes. o an empty subject. o LWS between colons, semicolons, header field values, and other fields. o both comma separated and separately listed header field values. Sparks, et al. Informational [Page 5]
RFC 4475 SIP Torture Test Messages May 2006 o a mix of short and long form for the same header field name. o unknown Request-URI parameter. o unknown header fields. o an unknown header field with a value that would be syntactically invalid if it were defined in terms of generic-param. o unusual header field ordering. o unusual header field name character case. o unknown parameters of a known header field. o a uri parameter with no value. o a header parameter with no value. o integer fields (Max-Forwards and CSeq) with leading zeros. All elements should treat this as a well-formed request. The UnknownHeaderWithUnusualValue header field deserves special attention. If this header field were defined in terms of comma- separated values with semicolon-separated parameters (as would many of the existing defined header fields), this would be invalid. However, since the receiving element does not know the definition of the syntax for this field, it must parse it as a header value. Proxies would forward this header field unchanged. Endpoints would ignore the header field. Sparks, et al. Informational [Page 6]
RFC 4475 SIP Torture Test Messages May 2006 Message Details : wsinv INVITE sip:vivekg@chair-dnrc.example.com;unknownparam SIP/2.0 TO : sip:vivekg@chair-dnrc.example.com ; tag = 1918181833n from : "J Rosenberg \\\"" <sip:jdrosen@example.com> ; tag = 98asjd8 MaX-fOrWaRdS: 0068 Call-ID: wsinv.ndaksdj@192.0.2.1 Content-Length : 150 cseq: 0009 INVITE Via : SIP / 2.0 /UDP 192.0.2.2;branch=390skdjuw s : NewFangledHeader: newfangled value continued newfangled value UnknownHeaderWithUnusualValue: ;;,,;;,; Content-Type: application/sdp Route: <sip:services.example.com;lr;unknownwith=value;unknown-no-value> v: SIP / 2.0 / TCP spindle.example.com ; branch = z9hG4bK9ikj8 , SIP / 2.0 / UDP 192.168.255.111 ; branch= z9hG4bK30239 m:"Quoted string \"\"" <sip:jdrosen@example.com> ; newparam = newvalue ; secondparam ; q = 0.33 v=0 o=mhandley 29739 7272939 IN IP4 192.0.2.3 s=- c=IN IP4 192.0.2.4 t=0 0 m=audio 49217 RTP/AVP 0 12 m=video 3227 RTP/AVP 31 a=rtpmap:31 LPC Sparks, et al. Informational [Page 7]
RFC 4475 SIP Torture Test Messages May 2006 3.1.1.2. Wide Range of Valid Characters This message exercises a wider range of characters in several key syntactic elements than implementations usually see. In particular, note the following: o The Method contains non-alpha characters from token. Note that % is not an escape character for this field. A method of IN%56ITE is an unknown method. It is not the same as a method of INVITE. o The Request-URI contains unusual, but legal, characters. o A branch parameter contains all non-alphanum characters from token. o The To header field value's quoted string contains quoted-pair expansions, including a quoted NULL character. o The name part of name-addr in the From header field value contains multiple tokens (instead of a quoted string) with all non-alphanum characters from the token production rule. That value also has an unknown header parameter whose name contains the non-alphanum token characters and whose value is a non-ascii range UTF-8 encoded string. The tag parameter on this value contains the non-alphanum token characters. o The Call-ID header field value contains the non-alphanum characters from word. Notice that in this production: * % is not an escape character. It is only an escape character in productions matching the rule "escaped". * " does not start a quoted string. None of ',` or " imply that there will be a matching symbol later in the string. * The characters []{}()<> do not have any grouping semantics. They are not required to appear in balanced pairs. o There is an unknown header field (matching extension-header) with non-alphanum token characters in its name and a UTF8-NONASCII value. If this unusual URI has been defined at a proxy, the proxy will forward this request normally. Otherwise, a proxy will generate a 404. Endpoints will generate a 501 listing the methods they understand in an Allow header field. Sparks, et al. Informational [Page 8]
RFC 4475 SIP Torture Test Messages May 2006 Message Details : intmeth <allOneLine> !interesting-Method0123456789_*+`.%indeed'~ sip:1_unusual.URI~(to-be!sure)&isn't+it$/crazy?,/;;* :&it+has=1,weird!*pas$wo~d_too.(doesn't-it) @example.com SIP/2.0 </allOneLine> Via: SIP/2.0/TCP host1.example.com;branch=z9hG4bK-.!%66*_+`'~ <allOneLine> To: "BEL:\<hex>07</hex> NUL:\<hex>00</hex> DEL:\<hex>7F</hex>" <sip:1_unusual.URI~(to-be!sure)&isn't+it$/crazy?,/;;* @example.com> </allOneLine> <allOneLine> From: token1~` token2'+_ token3*%!.- <sip:mundane@example.com> ;fromParam''~+*_!.-%= "<hex>D180D0B0D0B1D0BED182D0B0D18ED189D0B8D0B9</hex>" ;tag=_token~1'+`*%!-. </allOneLine> Call-ID: intmeth.word%ZK-!.*_+'@word`~)(><:\/"][?}{ CSeq: 139122385 !interesting-Method0123456789_*+`.%indeed'~ Max-Forwards: 255 <allOneLine> extensionHeader-!.%*+_`'~: <hex>EFBBBFE5A4A7E5819CE99BBB</hex> </allOneLine> Content-Length: 0 3.1.1.3. Valid Use of the % Escaping Mechanism This INVITE exercises the % HEX HEX escaping mechanism in several places. The request is syntactically valid. Interesting features include the following: o The request-URI has sips:user@example.com embedded in its userpart. What that might mean to example.net is beyond the scope of this document. o The From and To URIs have escaped characters in their userparts. o The Contact URI has escaped characters in the URI parameters. Note that the "name" uri-parameter has a value of "value%41", which is NOT equivalent to "valueA". Per [RFC3986], unescaping URI components is never performed recursively. Sparks, et al. Informational [Page 9]
RFC 4475 SIP Torture Test Messages May 2006 A parser must accept this as a well-formed message. The application using the message must treat the % HEX HEX expansions as equivalent to the character being encoded. The application must not try to interpret % as an escape character in those places where % HEX HEX ("escaped" in the grammar) is not a valid part of the construction. In [RFC3261], "escaped" only occurs in the expansions of SIP-URI, SIPS-URI, and Reason-Phrase. Message Details : esc01 INVITE sip:sips%3Auser%40example.com@example.net SIP/2.0 To: sip:%75se%72@example.com From: <sip:I%20have%20spaces@example.net>;tag=938 Max-Forwards: 87 i: esc01.239409asdfakjkn23onasd0-3234 CSeq: 234234 INVITE Via: SIP/2.0/UDP host5.example.net;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw C: application/sdp Contact: <sip:cal%6Cer@host5.example.net;%6C%72;n%61me=v%61lue%25%34%31> Content-Length: 150 v=0 o=mhandley 29739 7272939 IN IP4 192.0.2.1 s=- c=IN IP4 192.0.2.1 t=0 0 m=audio 49217 RTP/AVP 0 12 m=video 3227 RTP/AVP 31 a=rtpmap:31 LPC Sparks, et al. Informational [Page 10]
RFC 4475 SIP Torture Test Messages May 2006 3.1.1.4. Escaped Nulls in URIs This register request contains several URIs with nulls in the userpart. The message is well formed - parsers must accept this message. Implementations must take special care when unescaping the Address-of-Record (AOR) in this request so as to not prematurely shorten the username. This request registers two distinct contact URIs. Message Details : escnull REGISTER sip:example.com SIP/2.0 To: sip:null-%00-null@example.com From: sip:null-%00-null@example.com;tag=839923423 Max-Forwards: 70 Call-ID: escnull.39203ndfvkjdasfkq3w4otrq0adsfdfnavd CSeq: 14398234 REGISTER Via: SIP/2.0/UDP host5.example.com;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw Contact: <sip:%00@host5.example.com> Contact: <sip:%00%00@host5.example.com> L:0 3.1.1.5. Use of % When It Is Not an Escape In most of the places % can appear in a SIP message, it is not an escape character. This can surprise the unwary implementor. The following well-formed request has these properties: o The request method is unknown. It is NOT equivalent to REGISTER. o The display name portion of the To and From header fields is "%Z%45". Note that this is not the same as %ZE. o This message has two Contact header field values, not three. <sip:alias2@host2.example.com> is a C%6Fntact header field value. A parser should accept this message as well formed. A proxy would forward or reject the message depending on what the Request-URI meant to it. An endpoint would reject this message with a 501. Sparks, et al. Informational [Page 11]
RFC 4475 SIP Torture Test Messages May 2006 Message Details : esc02 RE%47IST%45R sip:registrar.example.com SIP/2.0 To: "%Z%45" <sip:resource@example.com> From: "%Z%45" <sip:resource@example.com>;tag=f232jadfj23 Call-ID: esc02.asdfnqwo34rq23i34jrjasdcnl23nrlknsdf Via: SIP/2.0/TCP host.example.com;branch=z9hG4bK209%fzsnel234 CSeq: 29344 RE%47IST%45R Max-Forwards: 70 Contact: <sip:alias1@host1.example.com> C%6Fntact: <sip:alias2@host2.example.com> Contact: <sip:alias3@host3.example.com> l: 0 3.1.1.6. Message with No LWS between Display Name and < This OPTIONS request is not valid per the grammar in RFC 3261 since there is no LWS between the token in the display name and < in the From header field value. This has been identified as a specification bug that will be removed when RFC 3261 is revised. Elements should accept this request as well formed. Message Details : lwsdisp OPTIONS sip:user@example.com SIP/2.0 To: sip:user@example.com From: caller<sip:caller@example.com>;tag=323 Max-Forwards: 70 Call-ID: lwsdisp.1234abcd@funky.example.com CSeq: 60 OPTIONS Via: SIP/2.0/UDP funky.example.com;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw l: 0 3.1.1.7. Long Values in Header Fields This well-formed request contains header fields with many values and values that are very long. Features include the following: o The To header field has a long display name, and long uri parameter names and values. o The From header field has long header parameter names and values, in particular, a very long tag. o The Call-ID is one long token. Sparks, et al. Informational [Page 12]
RFC 4475 SIP Torture Test Messages May 2006 Message Details : longreq INVITE sip:user@example.com SIP/2.0 <allOneLine> To: "I have a user name of <repeat count=10>extreme</repeat> proportion" <sip:user@example.com:6000; unknownparam1=very<repeat count=20>long</repeat>value; longparam<repeat count=25>name</repeat>=shortvalue; very<repeat count=25>long</repeat>ParameterNameWithNoValue> </allOneLine> <allOneLine> F: sip: <repeat count=5>amazinglylongcallername</repeat>@example.net ;tag=12<repeat count=50>982</repeat>424 ;unknownheaderparam<repeat count=20>name</repeat>= unknowheaderparam<repeat count=15>value</repeat> ;unknownValueless<repeat count=10>paramname</repeat> </allOneLine> Call-ID: longreq.one<repeat count=20>really</repeat>longcallid CSeq: 3882340 INVITE <allOneLine> Unknown-<repeat count=20>Long</repeat>-Name: unknown-<repeat count=20>long</repeat>-value; unknown-<repeat count=20>long</repeat>-parameter-name = unknown-<repeat count=20>long</repeat>-parameter-value </allOneLine> Via: SIP/2.0/TCP sip33.example.com v: SIP/2.0/TCP sip32.example.com V: SIP/2.0/TCP sip31.example.com Via: SIP/2.0/TCP sip30.example.com ViA: SIP/2.0/TCP sip29.example.com VIa: SIP/2.0/TCP sip28.example.com VIA: SIP/2.0/TCP sip27.example.com via: SIP/2.0/TCP sip26.example.com viA: SIP/2.0/TCP sip25.example.com vIa: SIP/2.0/TCP sip24.example.com vIA: SIP/2.0/TCP sip23.example.com V : SIP/2.0/TCP sip22.example.com v : SIP/2.0/TCP sip21.example.com V : SIP/2.0/TCP sip20.example.com v : SIP/2.0/TCP sip19.example.com Via : SIP/2.0/TCP sip18.example.com Via : SIP/2.0/TCP sip17.example.com Via: SIP/2.0/TCP sip16.example.com Via: SIP/2.0/TCP sip15.example.com Via: SIP/2.0/TCP sip14.example.com Via: SIP/2.0/TCP sip13.example.com Sparks, et al. Informational [Page 13]
RFC 4475 SIP Torture Test Messages May 2006 Via: SIP/2.0/TCP sip12.example.com Via: SIP/2.0/TCP sip11.example.com Via: SIP/2.0/TCP sip10.example.com Via: SIP/2.0/TCP sip9.example.com Via: SIP/2.0/TCP sip8.example.com Via: SIP/2.0/TCP sip7.example.com Via: SIP/2.0/TCP sip6.example.com Via: SIP/2.0/TCP sip5.example.com Via: SIP/2.0/TCP sip4.example.com Via: SIP/2.0/TCP sip3.example.com Via: SIP/2.0/TCP sip2.example.com Via: SIP/2.0/TCP sip1.example.com <allOneLine> Via: SIP/2.0/TCP host.example.com;received=192.0.2.5; branch=very<repeat count=50>long</repeat>branchvalue </allOneLine> Max-Forwards: 70 <allOneLine> Contact: <sip: <repeat count=5>amazinglylongcallername</repeat> @host5.example.net> </allOneLine> Content-Type: application/sdp l: 150 v=0 o=mhandley 29739 7272939 IN IP4 192.0.2.1 s=- c=IN IP4 192.0.2.1 t=0 0 m=audio 49217 RTP/AVP 0 12 m=video 3227 RTP/AVP 31 a=rtpmap:31 LPC 3.1.1.8. Extra Trailing Octets in a UDP Datagram This message contains a single SIP REGISTER request, which ostensibly arrived over UDP in a single datagram. The packet contains extra octets after the body (which in this case has zero length). The extra octets happen to look like a SIP INVITE request, but (per section 18.3 of [RFC3261]) they are just spurious noise that must be ignored. A SIP element receiving this datagram would handle the REGISTER request normally and ignore the extra bits that look like an INVITE request. If the element is a proxy choosing to forward the REGISTER, the INVITE octets would not appear in the forwarded request. Sparks, et al. Informational [Page 14]
RFC 4475 SIP Torture Test Messages May 2006 Message Details : dblreq REGISTER sip:example.com SIP/2.0 To: sip:j.user@example.com From: sip:j.user@example.com;tag=43251j3j324 Max-Forwards: 8 I: dblreq.0ha0isndaksdj99sdfafnl3lk233412 Contact: sip:j.user@host.example.com CSeq: 8 REGISTER Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 192.0.2.125;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw23492 Content-Length: 0 INVITE sip:joe@example.com SIP/2.0 t: sip:joe@example.com From: sip:caller@example.net;tag=141334 Max-Forwards: 8 Call-ID: dblreq.0ha0isnda977644900765@192.0.2.15 CSeq: 8 INVITE Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 192.0.2.15;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw380234 Content-Type: application/sdp Content-Length: 150 v=0 o=mhandley 29739 7272939 IN IP4 192.0.2.15 s=- c=IN IP4 192.0.2.15 t=0 0 m=audio 49217 RTP/AVP 0 12 m =video 3227 RTP/AVP 31 a=rtpmap:31 LPC Sparks, et al. Informational [Page 15]
RFC 4475 SIP Torture Test Messages May 2006 3.1.1.9. Semicolon-Separated Parameters in URI User Part This request has a semicolon-separated parameter contained in the "user" part of the Request-URI (whose value contains an escaped @ symbol). Receiving elements will accept this as a well-formed message. The Request-URI will parse so that the user part is "user;par=u@example.net". Message Details : semiuri OPTIONS sip:user;par=u%40example.net@example.com SIP/2.0 To: sip:j_user@example.com From: sip:caller@example.org;tag=33242 Max-Forwards: 3 Call-ID: semiuri.0ha0isndaksdj CSeq: 8 OPTIONS Accept: application/sdp, application/pkcs7-mime, multipart/mixed, multipart/signed, message/sip, message/sipfrag Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 192.0.2.1;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw l: 0 3.1.1.10. Varied and Unknown Transport Types This request contains Via header field values with all known transport types and exercises the transport extension mechanism. Parsers must accept this message as well formed. Elements receiving this message would process it exactly as if the 2nd and subsequent header field values specified UDP (or other transport). Message Details : transports OPTIONS sip:user@example.com SIP/2.0 To: sip:user@example.com From: <sip:caller@example.com>;tag=323 Max-Forwards: 70 Call-ID: transports.kijh4akdnaqjkwendsasfdj Accept: application/sdp CSeq: 60 OPTIONS Via: SIP/2.0/UDP t1.example.com;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw Via: SIP/2.0/SCTP t2.example.com;branch=z9hG4bKklasjdhf Via: SIP/2.0/TLS t3.example.com;branch=z9hG4bK2980unddj Via: SIP/2.0/UNKNOWN t4.example.com;branch=z9hG4bKasd0f3en Via: SIP/2.0/TCP t5.example.com;branch=z9hG4bK0a9idfnee l: 0 Sparks, et al. Informational [Page 16]
RFC 4475 SIP Torture Test Messages May 2006 3.1.1.11. Multipart MIME Message This MESSAGE request contains two body parts. The second part is binary encoded and contains null (0x00) characters. Receivers must take care to frame the received message properly. Parsers must accept this message as well formed, even if the application above the parser does not support multipart/signed. Additional examples of multipart/mime messages, in particular S/MIME messages, are available in the security call flow examples document [SIP-SEC]. Message Details : mpart01 MESSAGE sip:kumiko@example.org SIP/2.0 <allOneLine> Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 127.0.0.1:5070 ;branch=z9hG4bK-d87543-4dade06d0bdb11ee-1--d87543-;rport </allOneLine> Max-Forwards: 70 Route: <sip:127.0.0.1:5080> <allOneLine> Identity: r5mwreLuyDRYBi/0TiPwEsY3rEVsk/G2WxhgTV1PF7hHuL IK0YWVKZhKv9Mj8UeXqkMVbnVq37CD+813gvYjcBUaZngQmXc9WNZSDN GCzA+fWl9MEUHWIZo1CeJebdY/XlgKeTa0Olvq0rt70Q5jiSfbqMJmQF teeivUhkMWYUA= </allOneLine> Contact: <sip:fluffy@127.0.0.1:5070> To: <sip:kumiko@example.org> From: <sip:fluffy@example.com>;tag=2fb0dcc9 Call-ID: 3d9485ad0c49859b@Zmx1ZmZ5LW1hYy0xNi5sb2NhbA.. CSeq: 1 MESSAGE Content-Transfer-Encoding: binary Content-Type: multipart/mixed;boundary=7a9cbec02ceef655 Date: Sat, 15 Oct 2005 04:44:56 GMT User-Agent: SIPimp.org/0.2.5 (curses) Content-Length: 553 --7a9cbec02ceef655 Content-Type: text/plain Content-Transfer-Encoding: binary Hello --7a9cbec02ceef655 Content-Type: application/octet-stream Content-Transfer-Encoding: binary Sparks, et al. Informational [Page 17]
RFC 4475 SIP Torture Test Messages May 2006 <hex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hex> --7a9cbec02ceef655-- 3.1.1.12. Unusual Reason Phrase This 200 response contains a reason phrase other than "OK". The reason phrase is intended for human consumption and may contain any string produced by Reason-Phrase = *(reserved / unreserved / escaped / UTF8-NONASCII / UTF8-CONT / SP / HTAB) This particular response contains unreserved and non-ascii UTF-8 characters. This response is well formed. A parser must accept this message. Sparks, et al. Informational [Page 18]
RFC 4475 SIP Torture Test Messages May 2006 Message Details : unreason <allOneLine> SIP/2.0 200 = 2**3 * 5**2 <hex>D0BDD0BE20D181D182 D0BE20D0B4D0B5D0B2D18FD0BDD0BED181D182D0BE20D0B4 D0B5D0B2D18FD182D18C202D20D0BFD180D0BED181D182D0 BED0B5</hex> </allOneLine> Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 192.0.2.198;branch=z9hG4bK1324923 Call-ID: unreason.1234ksdfak3j2erwedfsASdf CSeq: 35 INVITE From: sip:user@example.com;tag=11141343 To: sip:user@example.edu;tag=2229 Content-Length: 154 Content-Type: application/sdp Contact: <sip:user@host198.example.com> v=0 o=mhandley 29739 7272939 IN IP4 192.0.2.198 s=- c=IN IP4 192.0.2.198 t=0 0 m=audio 49217 RTP/AVP 0 12 m=video 3227 RTP/AVP 31 a=rtpmap:31 LPC 3.1.1.13. Empty Reason Phrase This well-formed response contains no reason phrase. A parser must accept this message. The space character after the reason code is required. If it were not present, this message could be rejected as invalid (a liberal receiver would accept it anyway). Message Details : noreason SIP/2.0 100<hex>20</hex> Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 192.0.2.105;branch=z9hG4bK2398ndaoe Call-ID: noreason.asndj203insdf99223ndf CSeq: 35 INVITE From: <sip:user@example.com>;tag=39ansfi3 To: <sip:user@example.edu>;tag=902jndnke3 Content-Length: 0 Contact: <sip:user@host105.example.com> Sparks, et al. Informational [Page 19]
RFC 4475 SIP Torture Test Messages May 2006 3.1.2. Invalid Messages This section contains several invalid messages reflecting errors seen at interoperability events and exploring important edge conditions that can be induced through malformed messages. This section does not attempt to be a comprehensive list of all types of invalid messages. 3.1.2.1. Extraneous Header Field Separators The Via header field of this request contains additional semicolons and commas without parameters or values. The Contact header field contains additional semicolons without parameters. This message is syntactically invalid. An element receiving this request should respond with a 400 Bad Request error. Message Details : badinv01 INVITE sip:user@example.com SIP/2.0 To: sip:j.user@example.com From: sip:caller@example.net;tag=134161461246 Max-Forwards: 7 Call-ID: badinv01.0ha0isndaksdjasdf3234nas CSeq: 8 INVITE Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 192.0.2.15;;,;,, Contact: "Joe" <sip:joe@example.org>;;;; Content-Length: 152 Content-Type: application/sdp v=0 o=mhandley 29739 7272939 IN IP4 192.0.2.15 s=- c=IN IP4 192.0.2.15 t=0 0 m=audio 49217 RTP/AVP 0 12 m=video 3227 RTP/AVP 31 a=rtpmap:31 LPC 3.1.2.2. Content Length Larger Than Message This is a request message with a Content Length that is larger than the actual length of the body. When sent over UDP (as this message ostensibly was), the receiving element should respond with a 400 Bad Request error. If this message arrived over a stream-based transport, such as TCP, there's not much Sparks, et al. Informational [Page 20]
RFC 4475 SIP Torture Test Messages May 2006 the receiving party could do but wait for more data on the stream and close the connection if none is forthcoming within a reasonable period of time. Message Details : clerr INVITE sip:user@example.com SIP/2.0 Max-Forwards: 80 To: sip:j.user@example.com From: sip:caller@example.net;tag=93942939o2 Contact: <sip:caller@hungry.example.net> Call-ID: clerr.0ha0isndaksdjweiafasdk3 CSeq: 8 INVITE Via: SIP/2.0/UDP host5.example.com;branch=z9hG4bK-39234-23523 Content-Type: application/sdp Content-Length: 9999 v=0 o=mhandley 29739 7272939 IN IP4 192.0.2.155 s=- c=IN IP4 192.0.2.155 t=0 0 m=audio 49217 RTP/AVP 0 12 m=video 3227 RTP/AVP 31 a=rtpmap:31 LPC 3.1.2.3. Negative Content-Length This request has a negative value for Content-Length. An element receiving this message should respond with an error. This request appeared over UDP, so the remainder of the datagram can simply be discarded. If a request like this arrives over TCP, the framing error is not recoverable, and the connection should be closed. The same behavior is appropriate for messages that arrive without a numeric value in the Content-Length header field, such as the following: Content-Length: five Implementors should take extra precautions if the technique they choose for converting this ascii field into an integral form can return a negative value. In particular, the result must not be used as a counter or array index. Sparks, et al. Informational [Page 21]
RFC 4475 SIP Torture Test Messages May 2006 Message Details : ncl INVITE sip:user@example.com SIP/2.0 Max-Forwards: 254 To: sip:j.user@example.com From: sip:caller@example.net;tag=32394234 Call-ID: ncl.0ha0isndaksdj2193423r542w35 CSeq: 0 INVITE Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 192.0.2.53;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw Contact: <sip:caller@example53.example.net> Content-Type: application/sdp Content-Length: -999 v=0 o=mhandley 29739 7272939 IN IP4 192.0.2.53 s=- c=IN IP4 192.0.2.53 t=0 0 m=audio 49217 RTP/AVP 0 12 m=video 3227 RTP/AVP 31 a=rtpmap:31 LPC 3.1.2.4. Request Scalar Fields with Overlarge Values This request contains several scalar header field values outside their legal range. o The CSeq sequence number is >2**32-1. o The Max-Forwards value is >255. o The Expires value is >2**32-1. o The Contact expires parameter value is >2**32-1. An element receiving this request should respond with a 400 Bad Request due to the CSeq error. If only the Max-Forwards field were in error, the element could choose to process the request as if the field were absent. If only the expiry values were in error, the element could treat them as if they contained the default values for expiration (3600 in this case). Other scalar request fields that may contain aberrant values include, but are not limited to, the Contact q value, the Timestamp value, and the Via ttl parameter. Sparks, et al. Informational [Page 22]
RFC 4475 SIP Torture Test Messages May 2006 Message Details : scalar02 REGISTER sip:example.com SIP/2.0 Via: SIP/2.0/TCP host129.example.com;branch=z9hG4bK342sdfoi3 To: <sip:user@example.com> From: <sip:user@example.com>;tag=239232jh3 CSeq: 36893488147419103232 REGISTER Call-ID: scalar02.23o0pd9vanlq3wnrlnewofjas9ui32 Max-Forwards: 300 Expires: 1<repeat count=100>0</repeat> Contact: <sip:user@host129.example.com> ;expires=280297596632815 Content-Length: 0 3.1.2.5. Response Scalar Fields with Overlarge Values This response contains several scalar header field values outside their legal range. o The CSeq sequence number is >2**32-1. o The Retry-After field is unreasonably large (note that RFC 3261 does not define a legal range for this field). o The Warning field has a warning-value with more than 3 digits. An element receiving this response will simply discard it. Message Details : scalarlg SIP/2.0 503 Service Unavailable <allOneLine> Via: SIP/2.0/TCP host129.example.com ;branch=z9hG4bKzzxdiwo34sw ;received=192.0.2.129 </allOneLine> To: <sip:user@example.com> From: <sip:other@example.net>;tag=2easdjfejw CSeq: 9292394834772304023312 OPTIONS Call-ID: scalarlg.noase0of0234hn2qofoaf0232aewf2394r Retry-After: 949302838503028349304023988 Warning: 1812 overture "In Progress" Content-Length: 0 Sparks, et al. Informational [Page 23]
RFC 4475 SIP Torture Test Messages May 2006 3.1.2.6. Unterminated Quoted String in Display Name This is a request with an unterminated quote in the display name of the To field. An element receiving this request should return a 400 Bad Request error. An element could attempt to infer a terminating quote and accept the message. Such an element needs to take care that it makes a reasonable inference when it encounters To: "Mr J. User <sip:j.user@example.com> <sip:realj@example.net> Message Details : quotbal INVITE sip:user@example.com SIP/2.0 To: "Mr. J. User <sip:j.user@example.com> From: sip:caller@example.net;tag=93334 Max-Forwards: 10 Call-ID: quotbal.aksdj Contact: <sip:caller@host59.example.net> CSeq: 8 INVITE Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 192.0.2.59:5050;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw39234 Content-Type: application/sdp Content-Length: 152 v=0 o=mhandley 29739 7272939 IN IP4 192.0.2.15 s=- c=IN IP4 192.0.2.15 t=0 0 m=audio 49217 RTP/AVP 0 12 m=video 3227 RTP/AVP 31 a=rtpmap:31 LPC Sparks, et al. Informational [Page 24]
RFC 4475 SIP Torture Test Messages May 2006 3.1.2.7. <> Enclosing Request-URI This INVITE request is invalid because the Request-URI has been enclosed within in "<>". It is reasonable always to reject a request with this error with a 400 Bad Request. Elements attempting to be liberal with what they accept may choose to ignore the brackets. If the element forwards the request, it must not include the brackets in the messages it sends. Message Details : ltgtruri INVITE <sip:user@example.com> SIP/2.0 To: sip:user@example.com From: sip:caller@example.net;tag=39291 Max-Forwards: 23 Call-ID: ltgtruri.1@192.0.2.5 CSeq: 1 INVITE Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 192.0.2.5 Contact: <sip:caller@host5.example.net> Content-Type: application/sdp Content-Length: 159 v=0 o=mhandley 29739 7272939 IN IP4 192.0.2.5 s=- c=IN IP4 192.0.2.5 t=3149328700 0 m=audio 49217 RTP/AVP 0 12 m=video 3227 RTP/AVP 31 a=rtpmap:31 LPC Sparks, et al. Informational [Page 25]
RFC 4475 SIP Torture Test Messages May 2006 3.1.2.8. Malformed SIP Request-URI (embedded LWS) This INVITE has illegal LWS within the Request-URI. An element receiving this request should respond with a 400 Bad Request. An element could attempt to ignore the embedded LWS for those schemes (like SIP) where doing so would not introduce ambiguity. Message Details : lwsruri INVITE sip:user@example.com; lr SIP/2.0 To: sip:user@example.com;tag=3xfe-9921883-z9f From: sip:caller@example.net;tag=231413434 Max-Forwards: 5 Call-ID: lwsruri.asdfasdoeoi2323-asdfwrn23-asd834rk423 CSeq: 2130706432 INVITE Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 192.0.2.1:5060;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw2395 Contact: <sip:caller@host1.example.net> Content-Type: application/sdp Content-Length: 159 v=0 o=mhandley 29739 7272939 IN IP4 192.0.2.1 s=- c=IN IP4 192.0.2.1 t=3149328700 0 m=audio 49217 RTP/AVP 0 12 m=video 3227 RTP/AVP 31 a=rtpmap:31 LPC Sparks, et al. Informational [Page 26]
RFC 4475 SIP Torture Test Messages May 2006 3.1.2.9. Multiple SP Separating Request-Line Elements This INVITE has illegal multiple SP characters between elements of the start line. It is acceptable to reject this request as malformed. An element that is liberal in what it accepts may ignore these extra SP characters when processing the request. If the element forwards the request, it must not include these extra SP characters in the messages it sends. Message Details : lwsstart INVITE sip:user@example.com SIP/2.0 Max-Forwards: 8 To: sip:user@example.com From: sip:caller@example.net;tag=8814 Call-ID: lwsstart.dfknq234oi243099adsdfnawe3@example.com CSeq: 1893884 INVITE Via: SIP/2.0/UDP host1.example.com;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw3923 Contact: <sip:caller@host1.example.net> Content-Type: application/sdp Content-Length: 150 v=0 o=mhandley 29739 7272939 IN IP4 192.0.2.1 s=- c=IN IP4 192.0.2.1 t=0 0 m=audio 49217 RTP/AVP 0 12 m=video 3227 RTP/AVP 31 a=rtpmap:31 LPC Sparks, et al. Informational [Page 27]
RFC 4475 SIP Torture Test Messages May 2006 3.1.2.10. SP Characters at End of Request-Line This OPTIONS request contains SP characters between the SIP-Version field and the CRLF terminating the Request-Line. It is acceptable to reject this request as malformed. An element that is liberal in what it accepts may ignore these extra SP characters when processing the request. If the element forwards the request, it must not include these extra SP characters in the messages it sends. Message Details : trws OPTIONS sip:remote-target@example.com SIP/2.0<hex>2020</hex> Via: SIP/2.0/TCP host1.example.com;branch=z9hG4bK299342093 To: <sip:remote-target@example.com> From: <sip:local-resource@example.com>;tag=329429089 Call-ID: trws.oicu34958239neffasdhr2345r Accept: application/sdp CSeq: 238923 OPTIONS Max-Forwards: 70 Content-Length: 0 Sparks, et al. Informational [Page 28]
RFC 4475 SIP Torture Test Messages May 2006 3.1.2.11. Escaped Headers in SIP Request-URI This INVITE is malformed, as the SIP Request-URI contains escaped headers. It is acceptable for an element to reject this request with a 400 Bad Request. An element could choose to be liberal in what it accepts and ignore the escaped headers. If the element is a proxy, the escaped headers must not appear in the Request-URI of the forwarded request (and most certainly must not be translated into the actual header of the forwarded request). Message Details : escruri INVITE sip:user@example.com?Route=%3Csip:example.com%3E SIP/2.0 To: sip:user@example.com From: sip:caller@example.net;tag=341518 Max-Forwards: 7 Contact: <sip:caller@host39923.example.net> Call-ID: escruri.23940-asdfhj-aje3br-234q098w-fawerh2q-h4n5 CSeq: 149209342 INVITE Via: SIP/2.0/UDP host-of-the-hour.example.com;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw Content-Type: application/sdp Content-Length: 150 v=0 o=mhandley 29739 7272939 IN IP4 192.0.2.1 s=- c=IN IP4 192.0.2.1 t=0 0 m=audio 49217 RTP/AVP 0 12 m=video 3227 RTP/AVP 31 a=rtpmap:31 LPC Sparks, et al. Informational [Page 29]
RFC 4475 SIP Torture Test Messages May 2006 3.1.2.12. Invalid Time Zone in Date Header Field This INVITE is invalid, as it contains a non-GMT time zone in the SIP Date header field. It is acceptable to reject this request as malformed (though an element shouldn't do that unless the contents of the Date header field were actually important to its processing). An element wishing to be liberal in what it accepts could ignore this value altogether if it wasn't going to use the Date header field anyway. Otherwise, it could attempt to interpret this date and adjust it to GMT. RFC 3261 explicitly defines the only acceptable time zone designation as "GMT". "UT", while synonymous with GMT per [RFC2822], is not valid. "UTC" and "UCT" are also invalid. Message Details : baddate INVITE sip:user@example.com SIP/2.0 To: sip:user@example.com From: sip:caller@example.net;tag=2234923 Max-Forwards: 70 Call-ID: baddate.239423mnsadf3j23lj42--sedfnm234 CSeq: 1392934 INVITE Via: SIP/2.0/UDP host.example.com;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw Date: Fri, 01 Jan 2010 16:00:00 EST Contact: <sip:caller@host5.example.net> Content-Type: application/sdp Content-Length: 150 v=0 o=mhandley 29739 7272939 IN IP4 192.0.2.5 s=- c=IN IP4 192.0.2.5 t=0 0 m=audio 49217 RTP/AVP 0 12 m=video 3227 RTP/AVP 31 a=rtpmap:31 LPC Sparks, et al. Informational [Page 30]
RFC 4475 SIP Torture Test Messages May 2006 3.1.2.13. Failure to Enclose name-addr URI in <> This REGISTER request is malformed. The SIP URI contained in the Contact Header field has an escaped header, so the field must be in name-addr form (which implies that the URI must be enclosed in <>). It is reasonable for an element receiving this request to respond with a 400 Bad Request. An element choosing to be liberal in what it accepts could infer the angle brackets since there is no ambiguity in this example. In general, that won't be possible. Message Details : regbadct REGISTER sip:example.com SIP/2.0 To: sip:user@example.com From: sip:user@example.com;tag=998332 Max-Forwards: 70 Call-ID: regbadct.k345asrl3fdbv@10.0.0.1 CSeq: 1 REGISTER Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 135.180.130.133:5060;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw Contact: sip:user@example.com?Route=%3Csip:sip.example.com%3E l: 0 3.1.2.14. Spaces within addr-spec This request is malformed, since the addr-spec in the To header field contains spaces. Parsers receiving this request must not break. It is reasonable to reject this request with a 400 Bad Request response. Elements attempting to be liberal may ignore the spaces. Message Details : badaspec OPTIONS sip:user@example.org SIP/2.0 Via: SIP/2.0/UDP host4.example.com:5060;branch=z9hG4bKkdju43234 Max-Forwards: 70 From: "Bell, Alexander" <sip:a.g.bell@example.com>;tag=433423 To: "Watson, Thomas" < sip:t.watson@example.org > Call-ID: badaspec.sdf0234n2nds0a099u23h3hnnw009cdkne3 Accept: application/sdp CSeq: 3923239 OPTIONS l: 0 Sparks, et al. Informational [Page 31]
RFC 4475 SIP Torture Test Messages May 2006 3.1.2.15. Non-token Characters in Display Name This OPTIONS request is malformed, since the display names in the To and From header fields contain non-token characters but are unquoted. It is reasonable always to reject this kind of error with a 400 Bad Request response. An element may attempt to be liberal in what it receives and infer the missing quotes. If this element were a proxy, it must not propagate the error into the request it forwards. As a consequence, if the fields are covered by a signature, there's not much point in trying to be liberal - the message should simply be rejected. Message Details : baddn OPTIONS sip:t.watson@example.org SIP/2.0 Via: SIP/2.0/UDP c.example.com:5060;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw Max-Forwards: 70 From: Bell, Alexander <sip:a.g.bell@example.com>;tag=43 To: Watson, Thomas <sip:t.watson@example.org> Call-ID: baddn.31415@c.example.com Accept: application/sdp CSeq: 3923239 OPTIONS l: 0 3.1.2.16. Unknown Protocol Version To an element implementing [RFC3261], this request is malformed due to its high version number. The element should respond to the request with a 505 Version Not Supported error. Message Details : badvers OPTIONS sip:t.watson@example.org SIP/7.0 Via: SIP/7.0/UDP c.example.com;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw Max-Forwards: 70 From: A. Bell <sip:a.g.bell@example.com>;tag=qweoiqpe To: T. Watson <sip:t.watson@example.org> Call-ID: badvers.31417@c.example.com CSeq: 1 OPTIONS l: 0 Sparks, et al. Informational [Page 32]
RFC 4475 SIP Torture Test Messages May 2006 3.1.2.17. Start Line and CSeq Method Mismatch This request has mismatching values for the method in the start line and the CSeq header field. Any element receiving this request will respond with a 400 Bad Request. Message Details : mismatch01 OPTIONS sip:user@example.com SIP/2.0 To: sip:j.user@example.com From: sip:caller@example.net;tag=34525 Max-Forwards: 6 Call-ID: mismatch01.dj0234sxdfl3 CSeq: 8 INVITE Via: SIP/2.0/UDP host.example.com;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw l: 0 3.1.2.18. Unknown Method with CSeq Method Mismatch This message has an unknown method in the start line, and a CSeq method tag that does not match. Any element receiving this response should respond with a 501 Not Implemented. A 400 Bad Request is also acceptable, but choosing a 501 (particularly at proxies) has better future-proof characteristics. Message Details : mismatch02 NEWMETHOD sip:user@example.com SIP/2.0 To: sip:j.user@example.com From: sip:caller@example.net;tag=34525 Max-Forwards: 6 Call-ID: mismatch02.dj0234sxdfl3 CSeq: 8 INVITE Contact: <sip:caller@host.example.net> Via: SIP/2.0/UDP host.example.net;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw Content-Type: application/sdp l: 138 v=0 o=mhandley 29739 7272939 IN IP4 192.0.2.1 c=IN IP4 192.0.2.1 m=audio 49217 RTP/AVP 0 12 m=video 3227 RTP/AVP 31 a=rtpmap:31 LPC Sparks, et al. Informational [Page 33]
RFC 4475 SIP Torture Test Messages May 2006 3.1.2.19. Overlarge Response Code This response has a response code larger than 699. An element receiving this response should simply drop it. Message Details : bigcode SIP/2.0 4294967301 better not break the receiver Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 192.0.2.105;branch=z9hG4bK2398ndaoe Call-ID: bigcode.asdof3uj203asdnf3429uasdhfas3ehjasdfas9i CSeq: 353494 INVITE From: <sip:user@example.com>;tag=39ansfi3 To: <sip:user@example.edu>;tag=902jndnke3 Content-Length: 0 Contact: <sip:user@host105.example.com> 3.2. Transaction Layer Semantics This section contains tests that exercise an implementation's parser and transaction-layer logic. 3.2.1. Missing Transaction Identifier This request indicates support for RFC 3261-style transaction identifiers by providing the z9hG4bK prefix to the branch parameter, but it provides no identifier. A parser must not break when receiving this message. An element receiving this request could reject the request with a 400 Response (preferably statelessly, as other requests from the source are likely also to have a malformed branch parameter), or it could fall back to the RFC 2543-style transaction identifier. Message Details : badbranch OPTIONS sip:user@example.com SIP/2.0 To: sip:user@example.com From: sip:caller@example.org;tag=33242 Max-Forwards: 3 Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 192.0.2.1;branch=z9hG4bK Accept: application/sdp Call-ID: badbranch.sadonfo23i420jv0as0derf3j3n CSeq: 8 OPTIONS l: 0 Sparks, et al. Informational [Page 34]
RFC 4475 SIP Torture Test Messages May 2006 3.3. Application-Layer Semantics This section contains tests that exercise an implementation's parser and application-layer logic. 3.3.1. Missing Required Header Fields This request contains no Call-ID, From, or To header fields. An element receiving this message must not break because of the missing information. Ideally, it will respond with a 400 Bad Request error. Message Details : insuf INVITE sip:user@example.com SIP/2.0 CSeq: 193942 INVITE Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 192.0.2.95;branch=z9hG4bKkdj.insuf Content-Type: application/sdp l: 152 v=0 o=mhandley 29739 7272939 IN IP4 192.0.2.95 s=- c=IN IP4 192.0.2.95 t=0 0 m=audio 49217 RTP/AVP 0 12 m=video 3227 RTP/AVP 31 a=rtpmap:31 LPC Sparks, et al. Informational [Page 35]
RFC 4475 SIP Torture Test Messages May 2006 3.3.2. Request-URI with Unknown Scheme This OPTIONS contains an unknown URI scheme in the Request-URI. A parser must accept this as a well-formed SIP request. An element receiving this request will reject it with a 416 Unsupported URI Scheme response. Some early implementations attempt to look at the contents of the To header field to determine how to route this kind of request. That is an error. Despite the fact that the To header field and the Request URI frequently look alike in simplistic first-hop messages, the To header field contains no routing information. Message Details : unkscm OPTIONS nobodyKnowsThisScheme:totallyopaquecontent SIP/2.0 To: sip:user@example.com From: sip:caller@example.net;tag=384 Max-Forwards: 3 Call-ID: unkscm.nasdfasser0q239nwsdfasdkl34 CSeq: 3923423 OPTIONS Via: SIP/2.0/TCP host9.example.com;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw39234 Content-Length: 0 3.3.3. Request-URI with Known but Atypical Scheme This OPTIONS contains an Request-URI with an IANA-registered scheme that does not commonly appear in Request-URIs of SIP requests. A parser must accept this as a well-formed SIP request. If an element will never accept this scheme as meaningful in a Request-URI, it is appropriate to treat it as unknown and return a 416 Unsupported URI Scheme response. If the element might accept some URIs with this scheme, then a 404 Not Found is appropriate for those URIs it doesn't accept. Message Details : novelsc OPTIONS soap.beep://192.0.2.103:3002 SIP/2.0 To: sip:user@example.com From: sip:caller@example.net;tag=384 Max-Forwards: 3 Call-ID: novelsc.asdfasser0q239nwsdfasdkl34 CSeq: 3923423 OPTIONS Via: SIP/2.0/TCP host9.example.com;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw39234 Content-Length: 0 Sparks, et al. Informational [Page 36]
RFC 4475 SIP Torture Test Messages May 2006 3.3.4. Unknown URI Schemes in Header Fields This message contains registered schemes in the To, From, and Contact header fields of a request. The message is syntactically valid. Parsers must not fail when receiving this message. Proxies should treat this message as they would any other request for this URI. A registrar would reject this request with a 400 Bad Request response, since the To: header field is required to contain a SIP or SIPS URI as an AOR. Message Details : unksm2 REGISTER sip:example.com SIP/2.0 To: isbn:2983792873 From: <http://www.example.com>;tag=3234233 Call-ID: unksm2.daksdj@hyphenated-host.example.com CSeq: 234902 REGISTER Max-Forwards: 70 Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 192.0.2.21:5060;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw Contact: <name:John_Smith> l: 0 3.3.5. Proxy-Require and Require This request tests proper implementation of SIP's Proxy-Require and Require extension mechanisms. Any element receiving this request will respond with a 420 Bad Extension response, containing an Unsupported header field listing these features from either the Require or Proxy-Require header field, depending on the role in which the element is responding. Message Details : bext01 OPTIONS sip:user@example.com SIP/2.0 To: sip:j_user@example.com From: sip:caller@example.net;tag=242etr Max-Forwards: 6 Call-ID: bext01.0ha0isndaksdj Require: nothingSupportsThis, nothingSupportsThisEither Proxy-Require: noProxiesSupportThis, norDoAnyProxiesSupportThis CSeq: 8 OPTIONS Via: SIP/2.0/TLS fold-and-staple.example.com;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw Content-Length: 0 Sparks, et al. Informational [Page 37]
RFC 4475 SIP Torture Test Messages May 2006 3.3.6. Unknown Content-Type This INVITE request contains a body of unknown type. It is syntactically valid. A parser must not fail when receiving it. A proxy receiving this request would process it just as it would any other INVITE. An endpoint receiving this request would reject it with a 415 Unsupported Media Type error. Message Details : invut INVITE sip:user@example.com SIP/2.0 Contact: <sip:caller@host5.example.net> To: sip:j.user@example.com From: sip:caller@example.net;tag=8392034 Max-Forwards: 70 Call-ID: invut.0ha0isndaksdjadsfij34n23d CSeq: 235448 INVITE Via: SIP/2.0/UDP somehost.example.com;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw Content-Type: application/unknownformat Content-Length: 40 <audio> <pcmu port="443"/> </audio> 3.3.7. Unknown Authorization Scheme This REGISTER request contains an Authorization header field with an unknown scheme. The request is well formed. A parser must not fail when receiving it. A proxy will treat this request as it would any other REGISTER. If it forwards the request, it will include this Authorization header field unmodified in the forwarded messages. A registrar that does not care about challenge-response authentication will simply ignore the Authorization header field, processing this registration as if the field were not present. A registrar that does care about challenge-response authentication will reject this request with a 401, issuing a new challenge with a scheme it understands. Endpoints choosing not to act as registrars will simply reject the request. A 405 Method Not Allowed is appropriate. Sparks, et al. Informational [Page 38]
RFC 4475 SIP Torture Test Messages May 2006 Message Details : regaut01 REGISTER sip:example.com SIP/2.0 To: sip:j.user@example.com From: sip:j.user@example.com;tag=87321hj23128 Max-Forwards: 8 Call-ID: regaut01.0ha0isndaksdj CSeq: 9338 REGISTER Via: SIP/2.0/TCP 192.0.2.253;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw Authorization: NoOneKnowsThisScheme opaque-data=here Content-Length:0 3.3.8. Multiple Values in Single Value Required Fields The message contains a request with multiple Call-ID, To, From, Max- Forwards, and CSeq values. An element receiving this request must not break. An element receiving this request would respond with a 400 Bad Request error. Message Details : multi01 INVITE sip:user@company.com SIP/2.0 Contact: <sip:caller@host25.example.net> Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 192.0.2.25;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw Max-Forwards: 70 CSeq: 5 INVITE Call-ID: multi01.98asdh@192.0.2.1 CSeq: 59 INVITE Call-ID: multi01.98asdh@192.0.2.2 From: sip:caller@example.com;tag=3413415 To: sip:user@example.com To: sip:other@example.net From: sip:caller@example.net;tag=2923420123 Content-Type: application/sdp l: 154 Contact: <sip:caller@host36.example.net> Max-Forwards: 5 v=0 o=mhandley 29739 7272939 IN IP4 192.0.2.25 s=- c=IN IP4 192.0.2.25 t=0 0 m=audio 49217 RTP/AVP 0 12 m=video 3227 RTP/AVP 31 a=rtpmap:31 LPC Sparks, et al. Informational [Page 39]
RFC 4475 SIP Torture Test Messages May 2006 3.3.9. Multiple Content-Length Values Multiple conflicting Content-Length header field values appear in this request. From a framing perspective, this situation is equivalent to an invalid Content-Length value (or no value at all). An element receiving this message should respond with an error. This request appeared over UDP, so the remainder of the datagram can simply be discarded. If a request like this arrives over TCP, the framing error is not recoverable, and the connection should be closed. Message Details : mcl01 OPTIONS sip:user@example.com SIP/2.0 Via: SIP/2.0/UDP host5.example.net;branch=z9hG4bK293423 To: sip:user@example.com From: sip:other@example.net;tag=3923942 Call-ID: mcl01.fhn2323orihawfdoa3o4r52o3irsdf CSeq: 15932 OPTIONS Content-Length: 13 Max-Forwards: 60 Content-Length: 5 Content-Type: text/plain There's no way to know how many octets are supposed to be here. 3.3.10. 200 OK Response with Broadcast Via Header Field Value This message is a response with a 2nd Via header field value's sent- by containing 255.255.255.255. The message is well formed; parsers must not fail when receiving it. Per [RFC3261], an endpoint receiving this message should simply discard it. If a proxy followed normal response processing rules blindly, it would forward this response to the broadcast address. To protect against this as an avenue of attack, proxies should drop such responses. Sparks, et al. Informational [Page 40]
RFC 4475 SIP Torture Test Messages May 2006 Message Details : bcast SIP/2.0 200 OK Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 192.0.2.198;branch=z9hG4bK1324923 Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 255.255.255.255;branch=z9hG4bK1saber23 Call-ID: bcast.0384840201234ksdfak3j2erwedfsASdf CSeq: 35 INVITE From: sip:user@example.com;tag=11141343 To: sip:user@example.edu;tag=2229 Content-Length: 154 Content-Type: application/sdp Contact: <sip:user@host28.example.com> v=0 o=mhandley 29739 7272939 IN IP4 192.0.2.198 s=- c=IN IP4 192.0.2.198 t=0 0 m=audio 49217 RTP/AVP 0 12 m=video 3227 RTP/AVP 31 a=rtpmap:31 LPC 3.3.11. Max-Forwards of Zero This is a legal SIP request with the Max-Forwards header field value set to zero. A proxy should not forward the request and should respond 483 (Too Many Hops). An endpoint should process the request as if the Max- Forwards field value were still positive. Message Details : zeromf OPTIONS sip:user@example.com SIP/2.0 To: sip:user@example.com From: sip:caller@example.net;tag=3ghsd41 Call-ID: zeromf.jfasdlfnm2o2l43r5u0asdfas CSeq: 39234321 OPTIONS Via: SIP/2.0/UDP host1.example.com;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw2349i Max-Forwards: 0 Content-Length: 0 Sparks, et al. Informational [Page 41]
RFC 4475 SIP Torture Test Messages May 2006 3.3.12. REGISTER with a Contact Header Parameter This register request contains a contact where the 'unknownparam' parameter must be interpreted as a contact-param and not a url-param. This REGISTER should succeed. The response must not include "unknownparam" as a url-parameter for this binding. Likewise, "unknownparam" must not appear as a url-parameter in any binding during subsequent fetches. Behavior is the same, of course, for any known contact-param parameter names. Message Details : cparam01 REGISTER sip:example.com SIP/2.0 Via: SIP/2.0/UDP saturn.example.com:5060;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw Max-Forwards: 70 From: sip:watson@example.com;tag=DkfVgjkrtMwaerKKpe To: sip:watson@example.com Call-ID: cparam01.70710@saturn.example.com CSeq: 2 REGISTER Contact: sip:+19725552222@gw1.example.net;unknownparam l: 0 3.3.13. REGISTER with a url-parameter This register request contains a contact where the URI has an unknown parameter. The register should succeed, and a subsequent retrieval of the registration must include "unknownparam" as a url-parameter. Behavior is the same, of course, for any known url-parameter names. Message Details : cparam02 REGISTER sip:example.com SIP/2.0 Via: SIP/2.0/UDP saturn.example.com:5060;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw Max-Forwards: 70 From: sip:watson@example.com;tag=838293 To: sip:watson@example.com Call-ID: cparam02.70710@saturn.example.com CSeq: 3 REGISTER Contact: <sip:+19725552222@gw1.example.net;unknownparam> l: 0 Sparks, et al. Informational [Page 42]
RFC 4475 SIP Torture Test Messages May 2006 3.3.14. REGISTER with a URL Escaped Header This register request contains a contact where the URI has an escaped header. The register should succeed, and a subsequent retrieval of the registration must include the escaped Route header in the contact URI for this binding. Message Details : regescrt REGISTER sip:example.com SIP/2.0 To: sip:user@example.com From: sip:user@example.com;tag=8 Max-Forwards: 70 Call-ID: regescrt.k345asrl3fdbv@192.0.2.1 CSeq: 14398234 REGISTER Via: SIP/2.0/UDP host5.example.com;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw M: <sip:user@example.com?Route=%3Csip:sip.example.com%3E> L:0 Sparks, et al. Informational [Page 43]
RFC 4475 SIP Torture Test Messages May 2006 3.3.15. Unacceptable Accept Offering This request indicates that the response must contain a body in an unknown type. In particular, since the Accept header field does not contain application/sdp, the response may not contain an SDP body. The recipient of this request could respond with a 406 Not Acceptable, with a Warning/399 indicating that a response cannot be formulated in the formats offered in the Accept header field. It is also appropriate to respond with a 400 Bad Request, since all SIP User-Agents (UAs) supporting INVITE are required to support application/sdp. Message Details : sdp01 INVITE sip:user@example.com SIP/2.0 To: sip:j_user@example.com Contact: <sip:caller@host15.example.net> From: sip:caller@example.net;tag=234 Max-Forwards: 5 Call-ID: sdp01.ndaksdj9342dasdd Accept: text/nobodyKnowsThis CSeq: 8 INVITE Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 192.0.2.15;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw Content-Length: 150 Content-Type: application/sdp v=0 o=mhandley 29739 7272939 IN IP4 192.0.2.5 s=- c=IN IP4 192.0.2.5 t=0 0 m=audio 49217 RTP/AVP 0 12 m=video 3227 RTP/AVP 31 a=rtpmap:31 LPC 3.4. Backward Compatibility 3.4.1. INVITE with RFC 2543 Syntax This is a legal message per RFC 2543 (and several bis versions) that should be accepted by RFC 3261 elements that want to maintain backwards compatibility. o There is no branch parameter at all on the Via header field value. o There is no From tag. Sparks, et al. Informational [Page 44]
RFC 4475 SIP Torture Test Messages May 2006 o There is no explicit Content-Length. (The body is assumed to be all octets in the datagram after the null-line.) o There is no Max-Forwards header field. Message Details : inv2543 INVITE sip:UserB@example.com SIP/2.0 Via: SIP/2.0/UDP iftgw.example.com From: <sip:+13035551111@ift.client.example.net;user=phone> Record-Route: <sip:UserB@example.com;maddr=ss1.example.com> To: sip:+16505552222@ss1.example.net;user=phone Call-ID: inv2543.1717@ift.client.example.com CSeq: 56 INVITE Content-Type: application/sdp v=0 o=mhandley 29739 7272939 IN IP4 192.0.2.5 s=- c=IN IP4 192.0.2.5 t=0 0 m=audio 49217 RTP/AVP 0 4. Security Considerations This document presents NON-NORMATIVE examples of SIP session establishment. The security considerations in [RFC3261] apply. Parsers must carefully consider edge conditions and malicious input as part of their design. Attacks on many Internet systems use crafted input to cause implementations to behave in undesirable ways. Many of the messages in this document are designed to stress a parser implementation at points traditionally used for such attacks. However, this document does not attempt to be comprehensive. It should be considered a seed to stimulate thinking and planning, not simply a set of tests to be passed. Sparks, et al. Informational [Page 45]
RFC 4475 SIP Torture Test Messages May 2006 5. Acknowledgements The final detailed review of this document was performed by Diego Besprosvan, Vijay Gurbani, Shashi Kumar, Derek MacDonald, Gautham Narasimhan, Nils Ohlmeier, Bob Penfield, Reinaldo Penno, Marc Petit-Huguenin, Richard Sugarman, and Venkatesh Venkataramanan. Earlier versions of this document were reviewed by Aseem Agarwal, Rafi Assadi, Gonzalo Camarillo, Ben Campbell, Cullen Jennings, Vijay Gurbani, Sunitha Kumar, Rohan Mahy, Jon Peterson, Marc Petit-Huguenin, Vidhi Rastogi, Adam Roach, Bodgey Yin Shaohua, and Tom Taylor. Thanks to Cullen Jennings and Eric Rescorla for their contribution to the multipart/mime sections of this document and their work constructing S/MIME examples in [SIP-SEC]. Thanks to Neil Deason for contributing several messages and to Kundan Singh for performing parser validation of messages in earlier versions. The following individuals provided significant comments during the early phases of the development of this document: Jean-Francois Mule, Hemant Agrawal, Henry Sinnreich, David Devanatham, Joe Pizzimenti, Matt Cannon, John Hearty, the whole MCI IPOP Design team, Scott Orton, Greg Osterhout, Pat Sollee, Doug Weisenberg, Danny Mistry, Steve McKinnon, and Denise Ingram, Denise Caballero, Tom Redman, Ilya Slain, Pat Sollee, John Truetken, and others from MCI, 3Com, Cisco, Lucent, and Nortel. 6. Informative References [RFC2822] Resnick, P., "Internet Message Format", RFC 2822, April 2001. [RFC3261] Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston, A., Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M., and E. Schooler, "SIP: Session Initiation Protocol", RFC 3261, June 2002. [RFC3264] Rosenberg, J. and H. Schulzrinne, "An Offer/Answer Model with Session Description Protocol (SDP)", RFC 3264, June 2002. [RFC3986] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66, RFC 3986, January 2005. [SIP-SEC] Jennings, C. and K. Ono, "Example call flows using SIP security mechanisms", Work in Progress, July 2005. Sparks, et al. Informational [Page 46]
RFC 4475 SIP Torture Test Messages May 2006 Appendix A. Bit-Exact Archive of Each Test Message The following text block is an encoded, gzip-compressed TAR archive of files that represent each of the example messages discussed in Section 3. To recover the compressed archive file intact, the text of this document may be passed as input to the following Perl script (the output should be redirected to a file or piped to "tar -xzvf -"). #!/usr/bin/perl use strict; my $bdata = ""; use MIME::Base64; while(<>) { if (/-- BEGIN MESSAGE ARCHIVE --/ .. /-- END MESSAGE ARCHIVE --/) { if ( m/^\s*[^\s]+\s*$/) { $bdata = $bdata . $_; } } } print decode_base64($bdata); Figure 58 Alternatively, the base-64 encoded block can be edited by hand to remove document structure lines and fed as input to any base-64 decoding utility. Sparks, et al. Informational [Page 47]
RFC 4475 SIP Torture Test Messages May 2006 A.1. Encoded Reference Messages -- BEGIN MESSAGE ARCHIVE -- H4sIAEDwcEMCA+xdW2zc2Hm2nexNG6UN3LRF0QfaiKJdyxwdnkMOhyOPVrIt 27It22tdvHYTeM8MDzWc4ZAjkqORvK2bbIAAedmHtEHRdlvkoUCLFAjSlyLF 9rJPLYoWrTdAg6JFHwp0i+5D0SIoEAQFuj2HnAuH5GgoW3PxmgcazYU/b4f/ //3Xc04Rq9ipk1JGxe6xITVAW1YUvXc5K/W8syYheEygP0lIECWJ0gkSkMAx DhwbQWs4LrY57phdcerYrjr96AZtb91L5/0paTdvbazevLHOOXo933CIvUT2 cK1ukIxlb3Prq7fmYQZMT23pON/+Nr958RZXthxXzLRpS1YtL4EsWCja2CyV Cw+U8mWxeK2qVhoigkicnlrDe/wly25iW3XynEwPecmmO3GnzxPDOMstG/RQ pkrs09w5diU4s50p0i1LgTMsLrh4uyAiJEI0PbVh0Z3vYNexzLPcRtmqYYfu 692Gm2l6v/fcyuL01AVsGPzqxTxXbPO8o2qAXp4JTdUBGChKA6IyKptmEwCl pFZNQs+0XCqRupvncL1u6CXs6pY576h1erx1spPnkALpLSpcqyOnp4w8R29v eurpeP60L/yHNkQAGCT/IsiG5R8KMJX/sco/lbiu/DNpi6NoizHbVqLi1Ysf nsAiBEUYBgAUAymCQj9lYEYIochBEhiQ6BYXO1i1TM2CSBchqOwC7AAKKxqq ILMtsbmnVVaHJP9U8Mkw1f8g+RcAFI+xf6IIBJRFVP7FbDbV/yNpqze2VjdW jl78TeJ64g+pflWYwo5aAEHp9XiQqlGq22smlWEqsBAZFRHyvENUzax5VoQv vwJVuQoSOf/S+xgnQdskxixpTk9dpKfMc5ds/SwHBO4qNjlIWZETsnkA6B+3 sr5Bz2iZLi5R7DkXuEd2fCkTuNNFn5CYLr+xXydxSNXafJ2Y226Z3oPk4c5u gb5ZhVqZGj8G2eegIlNTQoYyvUGF3iC3ekvsAKM0PeUU+OmpUiG6wS0AhmS1 Am6ousXRLhdk7vbGrfnlrVscvSnItu3qKrE4BGF3ExKmp3DBdus1XM8jgbt+ 68KzjIbPJv6bQ0X/BP6fgEL2n4gkKcX/Udt/sY5Trw/IWhBqS0l8wGYY/b3W dQJpC7mBg71AXyl5rdcL9HeNu5WQC0jZnvKbIC313MNAf4+2Pi7f0yr/urkL hHHGf2QEwvafDFAq/xNn/1Uyj2EBCkgUstSiF6CYjZiBvSLpcyIoY6A7poqr jlrBDrUFWYwGO13/ra/l1/EhpYWFswtnzwYMuNNXLdKKLlUs0oMLC7TFmWhw oFl3SAtO6GvCCeOy4Wiv7xLbGaf/B0QxqP8lT/5RNpX/idH/ckT/y3H6P6nq 79H8yxlP+Q/S+DtNYuk7dRLQ+xuZlupPrPI9TmdKXw4r/Y5uF56x4FCxhKmz PFb7n4p+JP6Dsqn8j6S1tCcHAeBuXjtIpSq5kHwLCPqhncg+UJIygVd4PwcX ic127Mqmx4UA5cScCCAQqMKnyl/DVVSBxG4SVXOW11Wtk3OROiZA1/wImya+ 8SFQaUdtdyFCRtRGK0oFlTgLQEwU2OkGiLyDs/AQzAXxZfHwloKS62sqsE1p vCdtR4P/ZM8drveXIP4jS2H7T4RCiv+Tl/+r3H+cFIAIiWuHDcFsEP59Juxx /KanbpOdhm5T0DUtt6yb2+uNet2yXWejrDtn435c0d0yoSe6ZVt7+3xgd/aD TpwWbXt/+6K1bO5Ht8XkCXs03Mb1dU6zDJWnQM5T7vEUySArOKxbJsWyLOrb JUsda/4PSIIY8f/S+M9o7T8RKqKSlREQqDS6LrGZgHFFm+AqR6WKs0mJ6LtM uvpbiCBs6UGk5Kg4WyQo6y2Gw45qaahRgQDRj6aG6BU06Keyhh1Eyl7gBzuK 3rX5kKiIIbvvXBxs+Q4jUrDpaHrL8jsXZ/r5hAqAFVM1q6zWJ0ZK+xh49GYj Ft7TqP9LFLHtMed/5CwM+3/UaE/lf2Liv72aO/ekEWGF5fnpPwv2S7A3zG17 P5xhbyOIz7I9xkKT6JiihVpFCYLEven7qMbmWX5H5CGSIDp0Yl+h7THiwgcE hocbGS5Rpsa18eZ/JCBE9b+cyv8o2u2Vy6vrGyu3PXmNFf6I/DjYbdjmYyV+ u5FfdrpQvLYds7lY1ba2K1XbXWtiYl+71g76xu8SBIY2L1PuEcBS9Drb4AC5 9m0HAIgdfk5QZEhZENK2tN0UghC00DCrptU0vZN8YqLDrT6D45R/MStH5B+m +v9Zlf8cylEleTiZhwNlHsXJ/LlDCf3iJzAnpBYNm+yMNf4nICkbtv+ltP5r UuQ/makf3doq1IKSUEEVBCODgHLTU6t5rsV/Pda8ojDfXzMNZFQhQqIAQ2q6 dbJwnW/X9u+Kev9oBZTiEMsrV+4TrqMX3PWWgkUkPf3Vvsbe7UkKZajTi+K6 qQN24c5SZJnKleJJ01KwlOQwhTIxnYBywK+3Hn5R85OXxHCJPZ800xVtxCkN O/0zOP+P5DD+wzT+M/L4D305M2iZQeuMCALYFUSqqF6YkSWHzMgwDu08+2p1 BlLE2iX0jXZhiTjB47VisCgXwT15ekrPcz5/spEhQPFCwtVK1YTIMukXwKPA sBDIBoaKScM+DHTjEzUHJPmnp7hOnGomeyFuKMgC/Z12xoI5kxVqpLBL34wG Sparks, et al. Informational [Page 48]
RFC 4475 SIP Torture Test Messages May 2006 vXVpBokzSFg8ItTsC5ppaUDaDov/cMzx/2zU/6eSnOL/aOz/GVGmtvKMKPk+ gE22dce1sZ3p6w2cnrlHyVvF1DZxrIZd6jF2FzvD+wdSevCvQQQrWNUqPUVh Pmsy0Dd3mhYS7R2IdCRWbJYbLJkGRKZtVE2H1YX1JugvDBwDCIEyoz1wTGIE NYiCRJEL9kjssMWe4AE2dOwIfkowlBC8MJO9FCGFfnlYmDR6TOQRohDhkccf aCebDcMYb/5fjMb/sun4/wnz/xmb8DMA8OxDP9e2L1Ersqco0J+/44DhwG2W RAoEyFS13WpFxY5W3UFN0XLtHYBVR6OggHfVzpBgESk5Zv0d4PgPSvsFCnW6 okhvZSmy42IMVT/C6/nJjhfSzrYbtj7e8f9iJP4nS6n+H7X/Fw7gvXbbarik MIMuhLBhBq0cydwASBQkIRc3JqzfqHsPP/rVBbRZ2XMWeWY3lCs8rhBUtHmK DTtAyTV5DTeJXYY7fFk0pS58UKihyh8e7D3ylsa7ZcKXqRmTvOJvmMGz1A1M 25M13XQa2pj9PzEbGf8rpvnfseN/F+NbKOnVbQ3OKSgxOYWMx2cDQdFoDbs9 JA4qfZMISjo3yiD5d2vELY/V/oM99V9Z3/5L/b+RtFOUAYhNHFc3t/k1ygmW 6g2/k7JyTrl/Zu7NzIxuqoSosw89kBDuN8yG08BGZvP26sNXXIsvklNOwyav flF3zFl3Tne/MF+y8YP9187OLyycyX9Rd+fK2CkIZ5tEt9VTZ+rY+ULTeqje dy0r84pqEbYbr7uvLg0uP2lHdoSDyjczp2ay2TP3596cfdiKV51fuZ7/0gvc jU36doy7yL79aisoddj7iQ1zuVaVmMLDN/0PcHbuvv8JnZk5leH9E9UaporN UPBLo7vfYqUls7MP587cp8QzhdMffOXR9x790aM//+DtR9/74J0PvvHo+4/+ 5LRnMN/3jvpQmJ17kx6ZzwSM37YcNy1bnbl3jT+VoT0wu8S+vvnw1VcWz+W/ NH/6y7/02q+8FZhGS4AQ5STuEDwQNtYhK08lexTTHQriVwhWiU3PPXNm7j7t /vx/vfcXH/7e73/41Xc/+u33JncMzLNt/+1CSURjjf9lvfF/IfsvHf83avtv k9p/55eS1QDqmrvdzPTL+M4JCCBJkgTalihppmToVPB7C+vo2Qr1smWSRTbU r0SBivcCDq1jRK5moYZV1S44TjjO3o5AzAlZCbTr+IJkvafrAU2f+QVZkOOu M1BTJGU7hu/Rzgnz+LP6HQl20i5ouOPO/wE5bP+J6fyfk+T/JZ0F84mGBeW8 gL94YG7AZ9feGaJUR9MrbBZvpHZrQSRRPKD8zbFqJNksof2FvVUZrFl2DbtR 40b0rJtznuTSnuHO1Uu1BsfGGBdOiyI6PU9/PDff3jy2529Y5vawC4AHyH82 K6NI/D/N/02Q/HtO1CrHirg4zDE6zsQ1wlkaR21/m9TIE75xddtiokHl6nTs mN58lvZpTzG+UNgl9j5j36N87WKjQRbYJ+8k7C6H/So4ZXrn/omHcUtxL8/n JNTpu0Hf7uhu+Ya1xS6AebQ+RuMafkDdQcO7HB+w2cUO8+doQTRUcpP4J0Kx zYplz+MdCq8U/FMEzuDxyNH8a1+/99QN4jidWzjyDwHt3VY21Aq3Cf1xf/T/ 2yynd2wFlGOVA6BjLGz6PcNfp5RH+eKZrOW5VsfzRy3SvP9ch3f8ehszeA/7 C6M4k3dPMTFAilAI9bppu1EK2EuxFaUQQhRx5wFhmuUIDVRCNKvR4/TOCMZo Yo4jh+4p5npgNkwTcxwpRBN3PWKYJuY4oT7e4vJchCbUy7txNOF+5rjouUD4 OFEaQYk8rxiiXJQohkoe/OiFbAIaKQGNmIAGJaCBCWgSsLQABtMog0lyg0kS dHKCPk7QxQl6OEEHJ+nfASQRr7I1cY5a6MR12o7mqIy9Ubz8W2rB9cCa2THY lo+xZofxLBTlGO62O+wCwIHz/0Tmf5WEtP5vpP5//ERaR1Plp0BFiOQNg4X+ HR4UlgLB71aWcnC9iTTMZXqUIw7oI0FUEMzJYEKAwGg6qu7Ux5r/QzKL/7OB 3jKbDNqP/6X1XyNpR7P+ny9x52JQoDsf34Cq/zYjssIDXCypSxr1L/fjUnFZ 0GdiTgYKkb3iw/rpwn9d+R9//T8K5/8lANL5P8Yd/1/gDHswBPjCvacRXqFK LJdD/ANFSzIrMPJnZo/k+6ReUPC4058MVLWIpbOll7zi/qZt+p9ySLSr3qCi VvJPQNSkzIooQa2q0HfqIoiUgwwLYfSGxcGOxaQZFml7WvCfAaA7Vv9PhhH/ T07rP0aJ//H2X98ZYJ/IIczlBLEX41scqFXNHWr9UYwXEVAUrLKh37hJ0FKM FSjkFJTLDZjvQxhkCSKlPcfrcFB+4sNHtZIx7vl/gCRnw/Vf6fwPE+X/HXoy HTaVAkTJYMJiqzbEhY3YcKMAUPisqpVNZgJatl7GTU21MLJEW4IW0m2nu0IQ ta+o+ddxEyOCGfFFsyBKJYUF3iV77nzdwLrJxHqDXjaZdTjT4pp4n3MtjuVD adc0uRo29zmr5BLX4bBNOIetLuEQlREVCcd2zEyG+1nTnRp2S+VhgsDA+I8k huRfgmn95yTGfx6rrhOJEpQOWv4lyIMVNvOgs6dqRtKp3NNgz5HIPxyf/Mve +L8e+59+SeV/FO3Gyp21lY0rNy9OBgLAAQjQ11IPGeoHI0X/yf8GZ4TZTIWH N+njrPmJiNHUKFMPewG4AfIPRYH5/wjK9Mkj4M3/JKX6fzRtbWV9ffmyHwCu Nmp61Yqs/hvvAQhQpowMvAiqHI6g8mpOlkTEiypWCciqoKgWBYEQXuDbmxZs Sparks, et al. Informational [Page 49]
RFC 4475 SIP Torture Test Messages May 2006 VvAdlxIKjgILniUHqGCvqlQ+dXc/z9lSrWmT6439i7fvntfnwYZ+q7ni3EX2 ypZTnb8M7+yVtze2hFuX5PKVxvXVa+Duna1r98rXdpW1Sm6TvLFTXdsqmls7 SL5wcS4noO3du5XS+U18z9x+vfZGSblz4976xRuXLzxYntPuGMrayuaVO6v3 LOECuUqK6t35N4zta2QDg5vG7g6wXRm8LlX0da24s3a19vollxB9d7NcXbtz d3O5EAYuzWho2v5Sbx8uBpaqij6KxZ4Rdq0DRLJsUCsCtVRSAtiKVEXMSVgF JVHJSUpx6V5tT7hXuyddvyOU7+6DvRu65BThjXJxOZPppt1bjBHARJstqEVs fsUsWapubrO1vExs74dhs9YwXJ3BynxN3yPqQtFiQ5/t/YKMlVKRlAAsEaJl 2cjhi5g96XXsnqUeG3ez5LJ1aCUOiHlRzEtZ7vLaxvQUGwnIL2/TE3gcqNfq rD/mvZQ690qpYTvEeTXGe5MQQ2qej562v1eX4Ganp64Qw7CSHDmoQDxvkHdc m7DVQxKdB7x9/PbzL535+pWv/3j6+Asnvv328Qv0p9dOHD8uvAReeP65uc9+ 6sQvgJe7JMeFt49zlOQXKQn4ZVAXXgYvPf+pzU8/f/LE5rpwEnyOfXnxJOMN XbNsU8fC58BPsR9fOPniOja5q9RJFT4LPsN+mjr5HOU03RVeBbPs+8snuXX2 ndsgjstdILara+zmCLfccMvUH3f3T7x4/FvHdk6g4ye7lzfdubzjx5879umv fuWd/9F+cuW/b/M/+PA33vmdb33nox/93+e/rd3dKX7zP/7pzB/8ozRV/ruP v3vuz+Y+/tnGv/yD+s7dwg8vv/KjIvfjj5bd30XTv/X5//zDf/61Dz5z/qcz b9nf+MG77//1dzP/+1fv//1Pfm5+4cTDm+/P/utG7d/++Dv59xa1v/2bL//w L6997Ws/8+73//3jn+d//eaHb5E//c1Hz8U9OJ5/Vr0DT1jHq/8FCILjv0Rf /6frP40l/0s1SR2b+wnHf0JpkN3dtnfjV1uIrQjxx1t3Tf6Ok9BiVSXHlolc CljSrV2UxPvAA5yWTk6bpafZIgT9Y5jtLZEIZpL8tzcTJptnI1khqnjQtHjZ 0GOIZNQP6bHAvkVs8KgnVErDMmNtZskYcvYnQfynZ/5PD/9BWv83HvxPsP4n ZFj0ZPEgL7WDgllgxoc9w/qh4KWQbEmETdQpBwYJyoFRkol9e69MQk+W6OUf Z9VP5p/0qRRGIxsqYFrUIXEsc6zr/0EYyP/IXv0HSuV/JK29/jftf+6J1/bu MBOmUsxW9tbZ7PyKAiGbx7u7kne6ivfk6H9rlxhOaaz1/yKUQvKf1v+PPP9r 4XqmSEg9Pz/fFXqURwDAoxkGlItU+qIe6PD50K/0pYcHOxRhzKZf+Fs1uqt0 IH8JgT5jANpjMJUklV9iOifhTsNyi3i863/IohS2/+V0/c8Jsv+9+X/W7Ax3 NcOxaLyvRaOm/2ICHFBQzCKXQnAkUJslPTfgoLF9SthoT7rqpaTkJSCBBLCQ uNATjmHly6PIEdtkGzeGnABONv97r/4X0/k/R9KGvP5vTkZQKFcgEmDuoJVt O2zYEwNoizTFjL5r+jKF3w1O9vH9WxmqB54I57kb1k2TXDOtprNR1p31UplN QWbV8U6D8FQOcIEVaEak/BNpGtCOL2K15I5X/lHY/wdp/mfS5P8g6Y+VfUXJ IQQPHPTb4b4qEiXs2AbS1OLukgD8sohuNcJBC3ojKSPkKDViL9R3QF9oDfGD Vzuir0zvikef0DJS+gTYuknjlX8pG43/pfWfT7v85waJvs94IdEPZ3X/v72j 2W3bBt8L9B2IALsEcUqRki05c9Fi2LB2a7I169JDgUKxKFv+oRxSspqctp4H 7F2G9bjtFZI3Gj9RdiXZlpN2tZNVbFLHlCjJ9Pf/+x+29nu2wtS4DvXvQBu/ Dx5SKVSu+LQtgNfq/9RckP9Jjf+3BP+XN2AhVQY2ahLp+eFqs33eVlBh/Seg jZNBfx4ITpu2Q01IIFUKogMxw5TkCMOcuMyhmtAQTzxn6vLRGU24GHGWhP7A lU4cLMomFKvP+/WbSSBYapTYwFjtmijuMJQQRwdMP1uH2Jg4LctpNimxDesj zJh6p0a9beJ/U+d/ENLEoCim8n9t/9us/8/CFB0zMQ26DL3g7tQNRu7piH0Q +l9cvPEC6Ngtk8Xyh2rptanCQlxVRhaYK72BzwbJ3EBA0mxRm5qtFqHYhEQC I5//WSQMCtx56EqGQx+STfqcnIV+6MIb4rLEh2sJ6EoSifPGYz9iQt3CdCgm NrXVTsErvIX7OLaSc05cwdPgXcNWtw2nTESxYGjnCUc/iLCnUFbu3E5fg/Qm W8//blkL8T+E1vr/7bL/p0a+14tKwOraCeXY0GuUBKosBqRBNTMNQnCQp8iA d//e426XTaIsjp+Hp6F3Prft3cApYFjVOWGFog63pQfQRzsCJBsHW67/ha1W Tv5vZvX/mjX+b2KU878P1IfsxF+YOIecNycKK1E9FD0dDUCJSariAWZwudQf YL/n7DPkL6HgXmFiMuzKVmMcjNkeiNF6lNKU9nITMuhxNZM7VzFwt8fUAXXl 3BtfuL0qknL789EjJj91+6/19r98/ReN/6RV+/82zf+VZMwfKdU4HAdZesMR UohVntW4LdzRpF9E+mfuy4Z/JE7c596xgnDczDv4UjgrIHPe1Pfy/OLivEHU aYpnI/WjBH/E4/EpE2olRzpCQJ9F23Nenk4UFHX1FMzVorgfhuhUfbXqa4On DkN4I9KXJUzdvi5Pj3Sf1E6auHH37X8RJCBCJq7cYv2HZquE/5ZV2/+3w/8/ Sparks, et al. Informational [Page 50]
RFC 4475 SIP Torture Test Messages May 2006 rP7vR1X+RTkYHAaDvukOPe6eDYYJ4550pQ+MfwWfv1ZN4PVl4EqLjr/6Sa0i VatGrhx4fb9sH/n+GEW0Yh1xbBxzDz5R8TEPvzs8OjlEkVmxWKk72KeMLzHK VLo/sOsEns8ZWyJ6RCKR2+b/Fi7jv0lxjf8bx3/BxmHEGmo/esuFfoQq+7Gv gHhQ1bGT9wWsvFHR/DcKFUlpCCbDWHTZMsLimMTBdr7aQQrPYdCNqelYNoQQ Mx8iiPsCGpqLtYSEUNvJBxcv72Xy/4kYjvlQdseflgKslf9NWsb/Zo3/m8X/ kt1Mx8S1ozCCpnk6NK6rAX8T2QAZVPI6G2AT+D8mW8Z/Ssr4b5Fa/78l/n/A 8kCe8raSXWnLIXaLzrl0P4ogYShJkv1lYr9CzDJWp7CWqv/980mfcTdiXqNc xvE9MzYdnHfwL3Lj1QUnjOtEAn4JzcHaT8M+f308DqL+w8+tWmTMt57/a2Cj 7P+zDFrXf9vImEn2BGPUQWR3l6JdZO3uEnT51+Xf6OrXq7fq5fLPy3eXf1z9 DnOlqau3V7+hBrr85+qX2bHLd1U2cccu4aRBiemQIqHIgBKaAQ2B6Q/pgDCR MM+Xj48rUolXBiMahm43skJqYV6sXZAEwhMWXX7XSwlaFsbj2AsZxjdLE3Ls lXlCcOj2tRSsxx0aiQz4dLvxH0bLMsrxH0oArOn/hv0/02DKhr1H3b4biIbH RbegNGXdvtPe3Dnh8Ai1799bvxwdIIQUgQVnakcRMMOGf5Ty+/d8AZ1GUBvt PEXPQ8n4KRM99OrVq52dzPuqs009AQcfLcREwn9w5Q6CIl8Dz17jidIQv8QJ VaT66SOlsR5dmVaewdiBW+XiSLK20gg9UCen24GA1Wm38VwOnXE76mCZiZ8S Nu2QJd+4vDdi3rfM9SDEDCHOEl/PoayXLgKtO+Cxmlk8mLWq1+tPlPj6gscy dkc/w+E2OjjY21O/B2t5l664qm6W7rTUYYCy8PWPxAwCEnWfjm42P+sAz0Pd qf1h2oZ9tiepwfABAh0chpwEwO4KUJF9fXqHADIQyoQCJxgObITABz/fYn1F 9SfIE+kGG017n1jWvuLucK3sQh21aBaJDBF6igO2d36MQ6VqIBmJgCvw2gHw WglY6lJqtzWsd2ZhAGom/ZT6mSXYQzx9ygE6U8+O9ym9MXtfWQPI3Axrv2AK /fwt6/8EL9r/av3/Dvn/qix9vb70TCNHgDOQG4Apb+TzMQnJyKTCirE29xVM e5QYFZ69a/V4AitCULYd4Lr0Rz3qUY/PfPwLcaRGXQDwAAA= -- END MESSAGE ARCHIVE -- Sparks, et al. Informational [Page 51]
RFC 4475 SIP Torture Test Messages May 2006 Authors' Addresses Robert J. Sparks (editor) Estacado Systems EMail: RjS@estacado.net Alan Hawrylyshen Ditech Networks 200 - 1167 Kensington Cr. NW Calgary, Alberta T2N 1X7 Canada Phone : +1.403.806.3366 EMail : ahawrylyshen@ditechcom.com Alan Johnston Avaya St. Louis, MO 63124 EMail: alan@sipstation.com Jonathan Rosenberg Cisco Systems 600 Lanidex Plaza Parsippany, NJ 07052 Phone: +1 973 952 5000 EMail: jdrosen@cisco.com URI: http://www.jdrosen.net Henning Schulzrinne Columbia University Department of Computer Science 450 Computer Science Building New York, NY 10027 US Phone: +1 212 939 7042 EMail: hgs@cs.columbia.edu URI: http://www.cs.columbia.edu Sparks, et al. Informational [Page 52]
RFC 4475 SIP Torture Test Messages May 2006 Full Copyright Statement Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2006). This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors retain all their rights. This document and the information contained herein are provided on an "AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. Intellectual Property The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed to pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in this document or the extent to which any license under such rights might or might not be available; nor does it represent that it has made any independent effort to identify any such rights. Information on the procedures with respect to rights in RFC documents can be found in BCP 78 and BCP 79. Copies of IPR disclosures made to the IETF Secretariat and any assurances of licenses to be made available, or the result of an attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use of such proprietary rights by implementers or users of this specification can be obtained from the IETF on-line IPR repository at http://www.ietf.org/ipr. The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary rights that may cover technology that may be required to implement this standard. Please address the information to the IETF at ietf-ipr@ietf.org. Acknowledgement Funding for the RFC Editor function is provided by the IETF Administrative Support Activity (IASA). Sparks, et al. Informational [Page 53]
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